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Community of Philosophical Inquiry
as a Discursive Structure, and its Role
in School Curriculum Design
NADIA KENNEDY AND DAVID KENNEDY
This article traces the development of the theory and practice
of what is known as ‘community of inquiry’ as an ideal of
classroom praxis. The concept has ancient and uncertain
origins, but was seized upon as a form of pedagogy by the
originators of the Philosophy for Children program in the
1970s. Its location at the intersection of the discourses of
argumentation theory, communications theory, semiotics,
systems theory, dialogue theory, learning theory and group
psychodynamics makes of it a rich site for the dialogue
between theory and practice in education. This article is an
exploration of those intersections, and a prospectus of its
possible role in the formation and reformulation of school
curriculum. It will be argued here that, when formulated as
community of philosophical inquiry in particular, it offers the
possibility of ‘philosophising’ the school curriculum in
general, by extending the concept-work that doing philosophy
entails to all of the disciplines. The article begins with an
attempt at an operational definition of the term as, move to an
analysis of its dynamics, offers an example of its use in a
mathematics classroom, and finishes with a schematic view of
its whole-curriculum and whole-school possibilities.
One of the most notable pedagogical windfalls that followed on the
introduction and development of the idea of engaging children in
philosophical discourse in a group setting has been the emergence of
the notion of ‘community of inquiry’. Its location at the intersection of the
discourses of argumentation theory, communications theory, semiotics,
systems theory, dialogue theory, learning theory and group psychodynamics makes of it a rich site for the dialogue between theory and practice
in education. This article is an exploration of those intersections, and a
prospectus of its possible role in the formation and reformulation of school
curriculum. It will be argued here that, when formulated as community of
philosophical inquiry in particular, it offers the possibility of ‘philosophising’ the school curriculum in general, by extending the concept-work
that doing philosophy entails to all of the disciplines. We will begin with
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an attempt at a definition of the term as here understood, move to an
analysis of its dynamics, offer an example of its use in a mathematics
classroom, and finish with a schematic view of its whole-curriculum and
whole-school possibilities.

A WORKING DEFINITION

A community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) is understood here as an
intentional speech community in the form of a relatively stable and
regularly attending group of people who meet in order to dialogue with
each other about philosophical concepts—by which we mean common,
central and contestable concepts like truth, justice, friendship, economy,
person, education, gender and so forth. A group may be gathered together
to investigate philosophical concepts anywhere along a broad range of
discursive registers, ranging from highly focused and regulated conversation within disciplinary boundaries that is characteristic of academic
settings, and which will be the focus of the second half of this article; to
groups that meet with no prespecified agenda, as is the case with Bohmian
dialogue groups (Bohm, 2004). Although there is plenty of room for
argument over what constitutes philosophical dialogue in a group setting,
we can at least begin by characterising it as what happens in an
interlocutive space that a group of people enters with the shared intention
of undergoing ongoing critical deliberation together about philosophical
issues, with the expectation that new meaning or significance will arise
from their interaction that will at least be partially shared by everyone; and
that they will experience some sort of reconstruction of belief through the
challenging and testing of each other’s assumptions in the common space
of dialogue around which they are gathered.
Even in the most radical forms of CPI there is a set of basic discourse
rules, implicit or otherwise, that people tend to abide by, and one or more
leaders—we will call them ‘facilitators’—who act to clarify and to
coordinate the emergent structure of ideas and arguments that the
conversation generates.1 Following Socrates, who gave us the earliest (that
we know of) prototype for CPI, we will call this emergent structure ‘the
argument’, which suggests that it is a systemic whole that is involved in a
continual process of reconstruction; a process that is triggered and moved
forward through a series of critical interventions, or ‘moves’, such as
categorising, classifying and hypothesising, suggesting definitions,
identifying and questioning assumptions, offering and evaluating
examples, proposing counter-arguments, exploring and evaluating implications, summarising, restating, and so forth.
Most of these moves are, we would suggest, embedded in everyday
language and learned through everyday use. In learning to speak I learn to
classify (‘It’s a cat’), to evaluate part whole relations (‘I’m not finished’),
to make distinctions and comparisons, and to think analogically (‘It looks
like a dog’), to combine propositions syllogistically (X: ‘It’s a dog’. Y:
But it couldn’t be, it doesn’t have a tail!’) and so on.2 If someone makes a
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generalisation (‘All cats are black’,) I do not have to consult a manual in
order to decide to search for a counterexample—it happens reflexively,
and the same could be said for analogical comparisons, or for definitional
extension. Furthermore, our observation is that the implicit and explicit
discourse rules of CPI (for example, ‘everyone must give reasons for their
opinions’, or ‘everyone must relate what they say to something that has
been said before’) create a setting and a framework for the emergence of
these moves. The individual’s formation of a ‘good set of moves’ is
influenced by the modelling of those moves in the context of communal
dialogue—mainly by the facilitator but also by the other participants—and
the facilitator’s interventions that clarify or even correct participants’
moves. As Davydov (1993, 1988) claims, given the setting and the
modelling and correction processes, these moves are continually being
internalised and then externalised; that is, the participants put into practice
what was already internalised, and through this cycle the moves are further
transformed and reinforced. Internalisation occurs in an inseparable unity
with externalisation as much on the individual as on the group level,
through a self-regulative process (Davydov, 1990; Vygotsky, 1978).
Thus the assumption here, which is a pedagogical one, is that it is not
necessary to teach directly moves like making a proposition, classifying,
making a distinction or an analogy, or reasoning syllogistically; all that is
required is a setting, a task, and an interactive feedback-structure for
which their use is an intrinsic requirement. But one certainly can become
conscious of the moves one is using, and thereby enter another realm of
judgment (both logical and ethical) in terms of their use. Our further
assumption is that this metacognitive realm—the realm of the ‘critical’—
and the transition into it is one major epistemological goal of doing
philosophy in a group setting, with clear implications for the reconstruction of public discourse, not to speak of the collaborative reconstruction of
belief in a public space. In CPI as we practice it, the role of the facilitator
is to secure the conditions for the emergence of this realm of judgment,
which is a procedural matter, and to model and coach its heuristics.
Procedurally, the facilitator may act to regulate the distribution of turns
or the length of a speaker’s intervention, call for summarisation or
location of the argument, or support calls for group response that are
unheeded or over-ridden by the next speaker. Her operative goal is in fact
to distribute her procedural authority throughout the group—that is, to
promote a system-condition in which all participants, including herself,
share in regulating the distribution of turns, calling for summarisation or
restatement, and so on, as well as in calling for definitions or examples,
encouraging alternative hypotheses, identifying unstated assumptions, and
so on. As such, the regulative ideals of CPI include both distributed
intelligence and distributed agency (Kennedy, 2004a, 2004b).
Genealogically, CPI as understood here is associated with the earlier
Socratic dialogues of Plato, and more recently, C. S. Peirce (1966) and
John Dewey (1916, 1938), and their understanding of inquiry as ongoing
conceptual reconstruction. Psychologically and epistemologically, it is
associated with Dewey’s collaborator George Herbert Mead (1934); Lev
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Vygotsky (1978), his colleagues—most particularly Aleksei Leontiev and
his ‘activity theory’ (1978)—and that group identified as neo-Vygotskian
(Mercer, 1994), for example Rogoff (1990), Lave and Wenger (1991),
Wertsch (1991), and Davydov (1988); with Jean Piaget (1970); and more
recently with self-organising systems and communication theory. Mead is
important as an influence on CPI theory and practice in his claim that
primary meaning arises out of social interaction and is negotiated through
language, and that self/subjectivity is an interpersonal construct through
and through; Piaget in the sense that cognitive development is an
equilibrative process involving the ongoing reconstruction of cognitive
schema; Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Davydov in the sense that habits of
thought and belief, including the skills and dispositions of critical thinking
used in CPI, develop from the interaction between the interpsychic and the
intrapsychic planes, and that CPI is in fact a collectively constructed zone
of proximal development; systems and communication theory in the sense
that CPI can be understood as a emergent dynamic whole in continual selfreconstruction (Lushyn and Kennedy, 2000; Kennedy and Kennedy,
2010).
In terms of pedagogical heuristics, Vygotsky’s notion of the group as
located in a zone of proximal development probably best matches the
working analysis offered above of how the critical moves emerge, are
reinforced, and become progressively metacognitive in the development
of a CPI; but that analysis is also associated very specifically with the
educational programme Philosophy for Children, and the methodology
adopted and developed by its founder, Matthew Lipman and his
colleagues (Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan, 1980 and 1984; Lipman,
2003; Splitter and Sharp, 1995; Kennedy, 1997, 1999a and b, 2004a,
2004b). The methodology of Philosophy for Children reprises, in a sense,
the implicit Socratic ideal of philosophy as practised communally in the
agora as an essential discourse of authentic democracy. But it does so by
imagining it in the classroom and among children. As such, it represents a
challenge, not just to traditional approaches to curriculum, but to the
organisation of power in schools as well. In its understanding of
philosophical dialogue to be a fundamental educational form—a keystone
in fact, of emancipatory educational reform and reconstruction in a
democratic polity—CPI shows its connections with the progressive
educational ideals of the first half of the 20th century, best represented
by Dewey in his notion of the school as an ‘embryonic society’, and
education as the ‘midwife’ of democracy.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCOURSE

In a broad sense, it could be said that the mission of a CPI, its task as a
working group, is to clarify, to develop and, following Deleuze and
Guattari (1994) to create concepts—or, more accurately, to assist at their
‘becoming’, which, they suggest, is a process of shift and reconstruction
driven not least by exploring their connective relationships with other
r 2011 The Authors
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concepts. As a dynamic discursive structure, CPI could be described as a
non-linear, self-organising communication and argumentation system
(Lushyn, 2002; Lushyn and Kennedy, 2000, 2003; Kennedy, 2005) that
presents itself as linear, since whatever its emergent and open-ended
properties, propositions are offered, claims are argued through standard
logical entailment, and the conversation is guided on one level by the
classical laws of thought (identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded
middle). Analogously, it could also be described in Deleuzian and
Guattarian terms as a dynamic interplay between the arborescent and the
rhizomatic, or vertical and lateral impulses, of which more later.
CPI’s ostensible discursive aim is dedicated to making propositions or
structures of propositions that seek to universalise concepts like truth,
justice and beauty, self, thinking, animal and so on—that is, to reach a
reasoned agreement or disagreement about the necessary and sufficient
elements of each concept, and about the criteria through which the concept
gets applied, or lived, in the world of objects, persons, and experience.
This is often experienced by the participants of a CPI as a process of deand re-construction of the concept, which has been rendered problematic
by the very movement of seeking a consensus about its use and relevance,
and what the criteria for applying it in experience are. The felt teleology of
CPI, then, is to put back together what, with the attempt to identify and
characterise it, has been taken apart. This teleology is double-pronged, in
that the deconstruction and reconstruction of the concept is undergone
both on an individual and a collective level. The implicit understanding of
its practitioners is that through reconstruction the concept or structure of
concepts becomes more salient and more visible in its work in human
action and interaction, with the implication that it renders our experience
more self-aware and reflective. The fact that the process is never
completed is in fact a mark of philosophical praxis: half-reconstructed, the
concept re-enters human practice, where it is challenged by context and
experience to justify the new understanding of it. It then re-enters the
space of philosophical dialogue—both inter- and intra-subjective—where
the work of reconstruction is taken up yet again. The extent to which the
process is never completed could be seen as an index of the inherently
futuristic character of this form of philosophical praxis. Deleuze and
Guattari (1994, p. 108) write, ‘The creation of concepts in itself calls for a
future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist’.
We now list, albeit briefly, some other characteristics of CPI as a
discursive system—that is, as a coherent set of communicative, linguistic,
and argumentative practices. Whether they are descriptive or normative—
that is, whether they are brought to the model by its practitioners as
principles of practice or whether the model itself requires them—is not
always clear. This ambiguity is perhaps characteristic of any pedagogy,
which in its normative sense is not a technology based on a set of scientific
formulations, but a techne (Greek: skill, art, craft) based on a series of
philosophical judgments, and in which the descriptive and the normative
are in a chiasmic relationship. Insofar as CPI as here understood is what
Robert Corrington (1992) has called a ‘community of interpretation’—
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which, on his account, is always latent within what he calls (after Josiah
Royce) ‘natural communities’—the normative/descriptive distinction is
moot. Natural communities, he suggests, ‘remain opaque to themselves and
to their own sign material’ (p. 95), whereas communities of interpretation
embody self-reflexion and an openness to the ‘not yet’, which makes of
them ‘communities of expectation’ (p. 98). On this account the two forms of
community are in a dialectical relation. In any healing community, for
example, whether religious or otherwise, the drive for transparency and
transformation exists in uneasy relationship with the ‘natural man’. As such,
the characteristics of CPI that we list here can be interpreted as indices of
emancipatory potential—of the possibility of the reconstruction of social
and personal habit such that, as Dewey put it, ‘habits be formed that are
more intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more informed with foresight,
more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly
responsive than those now current’ (Dewey, 1922, p. 90).
1) As an approach to knowledge, CPI is fallibilist, inquiry-driven,
communal, and dialogical. That is, we can never be sure that we have the
whole truth or the final word, and we could in fact be quite wrong about a
number of things; knowledge is never fully and finally accomplished, but
is the subject of ongoing construction and reconstruction; knowledge is
understood in great part as a social phenomenon—something that we
argue, deliberate, and decide to be the case together; we arrive at
knowledge through ‘thinking for ourselves and with others’—a process of
self and mutual interrogation.
2) As an approach to agency and intersubjectivity, CPI aspires to a
multilogical, distributed, polyphonic, ideal speech situation. That is, it
operates through the expression and attempted coordination of multiple
points of view, multiple styles of thinking, multiple ways of talking, and
multiple experiences of the world. It is a distributed intelligence, in the
sense that the resources through which the argument is constructed—both
cognitive and dispositional—are not located in one person, but are
potentially present in each member, and are expressed through interaction
and exchange rather than as univocal propositions. The cognitive and
emotional work of the group as a whole is implicitly dedicated to the
emergence of a democratic collective subject—that is, a collective with a
general, shared disposition to dialogue, mediation, collaboration, communication, power-sharing, equality, self-organisation and self-correction.
The relationship between three levels of subjective activity—a) the
individual subject-in-process, b) the collective subject-in-process, and c)
the work of reconstruction of belief in and between these two systems—is
not a hierarchical or a nesting one, but rather one of mutual influence. For
example, the group’s deliberation on the concept of gender as it relates to
voice, individual power or influence, epistemological style, and possibilities of love and friendship influences and is influenced by my personal
process of reconstructing, through my interaction with the group, the
concept as it applies to my own life and behaviour and relationships.
These two dimensions—the personal and the communal—are in constant
mutual process.
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CPI’s implicit horizonal goal is the complete and equal distribution
between roles that involve speaking and listening, and a coordination of
philosophical perspectives. Thus, the goal of the facilitator is to become an
equal member of the group herself. Her success is measured by the extent
to which her regulative function—distributing turns fairly and showing
concern for the argument as a whole rather than just her individual
perspective—comes to be shared by every other member of the group. In a
mature group, each member takes the same care for the procedural and the
substantive process itself, which allows the facilitator to become more
philosophically, and not just procedurally active.
3) As a cognitive and psychodynamic communal activity, CPI is an
open, emergent, self-organising system, in that it is ecological, non-linear
and irreversible, only partially predictable, and develops through an
equilibrative process that steers a course between chaos and stagnation. It
is ecological in that the confrontation of perspectives that it entails leads,
not to a unilateral imposition of one perspective, but to the transformation
of the whole system to a new level of development, which leaves all its
elements intact but different. Here we may identify the system (at least on
one level) as ‘the argument’—a structure of propositions, assumptions,
hypotheses in dynamic process of reconstruction. It is irreversible in that it
never returns to a previous level of organisation. And because it is
epistemologically decentred in the sense that there is no authoritative
‘teacher’ voice, it is only partially predictable, and characterised by
ambiguous control (Lushyn and Kennedy, 2003), resulting in a power
structure that matches the normative requirements of the ideal speech
situation (Habermas, 1984).
As an ecological system engaged in continual reconstruction, CPI
exemplifies Vygotsky’s (1978) notion of learning as a process whereby
what happens between us is internalised so that it happens within each one
of us. For example, if someone argues through offering an example, or
analysing an example for its relevance, venturing a hypothesis, identifying
an unstated assumption or seeking clarification of someone else’s
statement, these communicative moves are transformed through the
‘internal reconstruction of an external operation’ into moves within the
universe of my personal thinking. In my internal dialogue, I begin to think
of examples, entertain hypotheses, seek my own assumptions, etc. And in
returning to CPI, I bring that growing armamorium of critical skills back
to the group, where it contributes to the ‘external operation’ of the
conversation. The group leader’s role is to facilitate that process.

THE CONCEPTUAL WORK

Philosophical inquiry is an inquiry into concepts. As pedagogues, whose
primary interest is in philosophy as a communal, collaborative praxis
rather than as a form of contemplation or apodeixis, we are satisfied with
an operational notion of concept as an idea or assemblage of ideas that
both influence and are influenced by our interactions with our world(s).
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Concepts, on this account, emerge and develop as a result of both
experience and reflection, and both transform and are transformed by
experience. My concept of friendship, for example, emerges quite early in
life, undergoes all the experiential vicissitudes that follow, and influences
them as well. Concepts are always to some extent cultural and historical
artefacts, and, as already suggested, they are found in relational networks,
or dynamic structures. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) speak of ‘zones of
neighbourhood’ and ‘thresholds of indiscernability’ with other concepts,
of ‘internal consistency’ and ‘exoconsistency’, and of a constant process
of ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘reterritorialisation’. Concepts may be said to
have conscious and pre or subconscious elements. To that extent, they can
harbour unexamined or even unrecognised assumptions.
Concepts are shaped by beliefs (whose relation to concepts, of which
they could very well be instances, we will not attempt to determine
here)—beliefs about how self and world work—and for concepts that are
ethical or that have ethical implications, about how self and world should
work. As such, concepts have a potential opening or ‘crack’ in them,
whether between the nafve and the scientific, the descriptive and the
normative, or the individual and the universal. This crack in the concept is
where contradiction is encountered, problematisation begins, and where its
propositional content breaks open into a question, or series of questions.
The concept of friendship, for example, cracks open on the normative
question of whether I am or could or should be a friend of all humankind,
or whether there is such a thing as friendship across species. It could be
argued that this crack, and the questions that emerge from it, is the focal
point for our historical potential as a species, for it is here that cognitive,
and by implication psychological, social and political reconstruction
become possible, and the actual encounters the utopian.
The concepts ‘alive’, or ‘friendship’, or ‘time’, or ‘truth’, or ‘body’, or
‘play’, or ‘mind’, or ‘measurement’, or ‘infinity’, or ‘number’, or ‘order’,
can be distinguished from other concepts—for example ‘vehicle’ or
‘eating’ or ‘sleep’—in that they are common, central, and contestable
(Splitter and Sharp, 1995); although it could be argued that the latter can
be moved into the realm of the contestable by pushing their semantic
boundaries, or ‘zones of neighbourhood’. They are common because, for
example, we all—even the most individualistic loner—have a concept of
friendship; central because how we construct them is important to how we
think about and how we perform our lives; and contestable first, because
there are as many versions of them as there are people, and second,
because they are—or, we believe, ought to be—under continuous
reconstruction as a result of ongoing experience and reflection.
The process of problematisation and reconstruction tends to begin when
we encounter some stimulus—whether artefact, event, or intuitive
realisation—that makes us see or feel the crack in a concept. Usually
common, central, and contestable concepts are already problematised in
our own inner lives anyway through the contradictions that emerge
through everyday experience, and as such, we are existentially primed for
this moment. Another major impetus for problematisation may be our
r 2011 The Authors
Journal compilation r 2011 Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain

Community of Philosophical Inquiry

273

common interest in resolving the tension between our multiple versions of
the same concept through entering dialogue, where we can take advantage
of the shared underlying structures of our concepts, which are linguistic
and logical, in order to find points of convergence of meaning, and where
we realise that, although they are marked by difference, concepts are
neither infinite nor without constraints.
In keeping with the notion that a concept is approached initially as a set
of propositions which, when deconstructed, turn into questions, probably
the most widely known school curriculum in CPI—the Philosophy for
Children novels and manuals—is comprised entirely of questions
clustered around the concepts it offers for interrogation. This curriculum
favours the story over the textbook as stimulus, because the latter tends to
understand itself as a book of answers, and the former a provoker of
questions. The textbook assumes that the question has already been asked,
and thus suppresses it. Any question it might pose is a rhetorical one—a
question to which the answer is already known. The philosophical novel,
because it is a narrative as opposed to an expository text—makes it
possible to represent the multivocal, dialogical and non-linear, contextually situated practice of group deliberation. It can portray the inquiry
process through character, plot and dialogue, ‘the way we think when we
inquire’, as Lipman (2003, p. 85) puts it. The narrative3 can be so constructed that it assumes nothing, or at least seeks to identify and question
its own assumptions. It can dramatize the emergence of questions, and the
dialogue that those questions trigger. And the Lipmanian manuals that
accompany the novels are, at base, simply lists of questions about the
concepts that are highlighted in the novels, aimed at triggering and
enhancing critical dialogue.
In contradistinction to the approach of Socrates, and perhaps influenced
by the fact that this particular formulation of CPI methodology has its
origins in a programme for children, the Lipmanian discussion plan tends
to approach concept-work through analogical reasoning and categorical
play. It seeks to render the concept ‘fuzzy’—to push it beyond the boundaries of its conventional use through a sort of poetics of instantiation: the
concept is applied beyond its familiar denotation through playing with its
extensional possibilities, which sets up a dialectical relation between the
‘literal’ and the metaphorical. For example, a discussion plan on thinking
in the manual for a novel for young children (Lipman and Gazzard, 1987,
p. 21) presents a list of things and asks if they ‘think’—cats, beetles, trees,
houses, automobiles, computers, a piano player’s fingers, and so on. The
imposed limitations on the applications of the concept within ordinary
speech are challenged,4 on the wager that through exploration of the fuzzy
regions of the concept, in the transitional space of CPI, it returns to the
space of everyday life richer, more complex, more positively ambiguous,
more reflexive, more flexible.
The process of reconstruction involves conflict, but it is a conflict of
ideas, and it is conflict in the service of building on each other’s ideas
rather than negating or polarising them. It requires a certain level of
tolerance of suspense, because the concept in fact is never completely
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reconstructed, or if so, only as a provisional construct, or ‘warranted
conclusion’ that assumes the warrants are always open to revision. As
such, it represents a qualitative shift in epistemological outlook. This new
relationship to certainty, and this willingness and capacity to suspend
judgment indefinitely is in fact one key epistemological characteristic of
critical thinking (Dewey, 1898) and the reconstruction of subjectivity in an
age of globalisation.5
In community of philosophical inquiry the concept comes apart through
interrogating it, and the group begins rebuilding it, session by session. It
might be thought of as a communal house building project, except that the
building will only be finished ‘in the long run’, and in our actual
experience we are continually moving, replacing, altering or reshaping the
pieces, or even tearing down what we have and redesigning it. Each time
we leave a session we take a slightly revised notion of the concept—and of
how concepts work in general—with us, which we tend to reflect on in
terms of our own individual experience. And as we explore one concept
we encounter their connections with others—concepts that seem logically
prior to or even part of the one we are working on reconstructing.
We might find that in working on the concept of justice for example, we
find that we have to define ‘person’, which might lead us to ask whether
justice can be applied to ‘animals’. This might lead us to reflect on the
similarities and differences between animals and humans, which might—
if the question of whether animals ‘think’ arises—prompt us to deliberate
on what we mean by thinking, then on how language works—and so on. In
other words, a CPI curriculum is inherently emergent and rhizomatic
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980), with interlinking and recursive multiple
strands. We would hesitate, however, to characterise it as a rhizomatic
system per se. Rather, observation leads us to describe the phenomenon as
a dialectical struggle between two impulses—crudely put, the vertical and
the lateral—in spontaneous group argumentation, and affective and
political (that is, power) organisation as well (Kennedy, 1997). The
vertical, ‘arborescent’ impulse seeks unification through establishing
classes and categories, and identifying criteria through which the
relationships between all things are illuminated and clarified. In vertical
organisation, above is distinguishable from below, and everything finds its
proper place. The lateral impulse, which the philosopher Emmanuel
Levinas (1969), in opposition to totality or sameness, calls infinity, and
which here is called the rhizome, is the impulse of difference, multiplicity,
the plural. It makes distinctions that are not assimilable by a unity that
includes them both; rather, it holds those distinctions in loose and
provisional—to use Deleuze’s and Guattari’s term—‘assemblages’. Rather
than arrange an idea above or below another, or in a relationship of
exclusion or inclusion, the horizontal or rhizomatic impulse typically offers
the counterexample that negates the all-statement status of the generalisation, moves sideways or into another semantic field altogether, and sets
up asymmetrical but related connections with the concept from which it
broke away. This appears to be directly contradictory to the metaphor of
building a house together, because a building requires things that hold each
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other up, and which rest on a foundation. The rhizomatic metaphor has no
obvious centre or ground, no one fulcrum of support or main root.
Even if we console ourselves with Wittgenstein’s (1969) suggestion that
‘the foundation walls are carried by the whole house’, the conflict between
the two principles of organisation appears irreconcilable. One is based on
criteria that include other criteria, all of them superseded by yet another,
higher criterion of ‘reasonableness’ or ‘likelihood’. The other is based on
the principle of the rhizome. One aspires to order, control and clear
boundaries through the imposition of a binary logic of hierarchical,
nesting classes, with clear lines of inclusion and exclusion; the other
insists on unpredictable, emergent ‘assemblages’ and a ‘non-hierarchical,
a-centred field of knowledge’, on the principle of multiplicity as opposed
to the principle of unity, and for open-ended creation of concepts as
opposed to the reproduction or repetition of established patterns as
essential to insight.
However, in the actual functioning of CPI, both principles can be seen
to be operating, playing together, sometimes like a cat chasing its tail, and
sometimes in a dialectical struggle. For example, the argument quite often
proceeds by someone making a proposition or generalisation, an ‘all
statement’ direct or implied, which—in the spontaneous emergence of
dialogical argumentation—triggers a counterexample, which moves the
group (or the personified ‘Argument’) to work to reconstruct the concept
so that it can assimilate the counterexample. This results in a new
generalisation, and this movement from general to specific and back to
general again contributes to a condition of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s
‘connection and heterogeneity’, in which the concept divides but its
elements remain connected, thus creating a new structure.

CPI ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES

We now wish to move, in a rhizomatic fashion, to a brief discussion of the
uses of CPI as a model for curriculum development in pre-collegiate
education, and to reflect on the implications of the introduction of this
form of ‘community of interpretation’ into the ‘natural community’ of the
school. The emergent and rhizomatic character of the developmental
movement of CPI has, we would suggest, broad implications for
curriculum reconstruction—both in deconstructing the artificial divisions
between self-contained units that now characterise school curriculum, and
in extending philosophical inquiry across all the content areas. The
activity of CPI promises to open a dimension in curriculum in general, in
which the common, central, and contestable concepts of each discipline—
their ‘big ideas’—assume a certain epistemological priority. To include, as
part of a history class, for example, regular interrogation of concepts such
as fact, truth, objectivity, perspective, power, conflict, progress, civilisation, causation, period (epoch), agency, narrative, cause, and so on, is to
confront that discipline with its own philosophical assumptions, and reveal
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the extent to which it is a cultural and historical construction—in short, to
render it critical and self-reflective.
The majority of common, central, and contestable concepts are present,
not just in philosophy class, but also all the way across the content areas.
Some, like ‘measurement’, or ‘equality’, or ‘fact’, obviously appear in
more than one place, and others will emerge in the specific context of the
discipline. In fact it should be no surprise that the collective assemblages
of concepts that express and articulate our belief systems underlie the
school curriculum. They and their relationships influence how we
approach anthropology, history, language, mathematics, art, economics
and so on. In this sense, philosophy—or at least philosophy understood as
the ongoing reconstruction of concepts—is implicit and potentially
present in every class we teach. What is necessary for it to emerge as a
discourse in a discipline is to identify the set of concepts that inform the
discipline and to develop sets of questions for inquiry, or texts designed to
trigger questions, or both. It is even possible to use the standard textbook
as a framework. We could take, for example, a set of concepts in
science—organism, life, measurement, fact, experiment, nature, environment, matter, energy, cause, hypothesis, theory and so on—assign them to
those chapters of the textbook in which they figure most obviously, and
take them as a guide to practicing CPI once a week in science class. In this
way we add a philosophy of science component to the science curriculum
itself. Once students become adept at spotting common, central, and
contestable concepts, which typically happens extremely quickly, they
themselves can identify them in the textbook, thus approaching the latter
critically—as a narrative rather than an exposition of the ‘truth’.

THE CASE OF MATHEMATICS

By way of illustration of this process of ‘philosophising’ school
curriculum, we would like to reflect briefly on the case of mathematics.
In maths education the term ‘community of inquiry’ usually refers to a
classroom that engages the learning community in doing mathematics
collaboratively. Most documented research in this area portrays community of mathematical inquiry as collective work, with or without a
facilitator, on well-defined mathematical problems, where students are in a
position to ask practically oriented or procedural questions aimed at
solving specific mathematical problems.
This certainly promotes more flexible thinking and greater procedural
fluency in problem solving, in its attempt to replace exclusive concern for
the right answer with a care to explore different possible ways of
answering the question, and in many cases, to investigate different
possible representations of the situation that might lead to different
methods of solving the problem. But from an epistemological point of
view, this sort of conceptual understanding and procedural fluency in
mathematics is still not enough to evoke higher-order thinking in students,
unless this thinking is connected with their knowledge in other
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epistemological domains, and with authentic mathematical experience—
that is, with the experience of using and reflecting on the use of
mathematics in the world. Philosophical inquiry allows for and encourages
a search for meaning in mathematical concepts beyond procedural fluency
and conceptual understanding within the system, by offering students the
possibility of questioning mathematics as a system per se—its nature,
uses, its power and its limitations, and its existential value. CPI, with its
dialectical process of knowledge construction, invites children to pose
questions of their own about mathematics, both in its internal relations and
its relation to the world—and, by implication, across the disciplines.
One major avenue for such inquiry is, as we have argued above, through
the problematisation of the common, central, and contestable concepts that
are common to mathematics, science, history, and other school curricula—
like measurement, fact, objectivity, certainty, change, chance, equality,
structure, and so on. Each of these concepts is an assemblage of different
meaning-aspects derived from each disciplinary landscape it populates.
For example, measuring an object’s height in mathematics or physics is
different from measuring learning, or anxiety, or the difference between
two poems. In a sense, every new conceptual aspect brought to light may
produce a new synthesis of the problematised concept. And since every
concept is related to other concepts, it is impossible to approach a
thorough grasp of a concept without tracing these connections, and not
only those already given, but those created in the process of synthesising
it, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) words, in ‘bringing [it] forth’.
For example, in problematising the concept ‘algorithm’, which might be
defined as ‘a finite sequence of well-defined instructions for completing a
task’, we may examine the differences between the use of the concept in our
everyday lives and how it is used in mathematics. One may inquire, for
example, whether ‘algorithm’ is recognisable in psychological and sociological contexts—for example, do we think algorithmically in our everyday
activities? Are there subconscious or unconscious algorithms that guide or
underlie events like arguments, or shopping expeditions? Is an unconscious
algorithm an algorithm at all, or something else? Is there a difference
between algorithms in assembling a device of some kind and algorithms in
mathematics? Is a mathematical formula an algorithm? Does the use of any
algorithm require mathematical reasoning, and if so, what kind of reasoning?
These questions interrogate the relation between this concept and other
related concepts, such as automatisation, and even thinking in general.
Our expectation is that, after exporting the concept into other contexts and
examining it there, our understanding is enhanced when it is re-imported
into the universe of mathematics, with all of its newly acquired dimensions,
acquired from its traversal of other disciplines. Similarly, spaces for the
problematisation of more strictly mathematical concepts may be located in
the discrepancies between different students’ definitions, interpretations,
and understandings of a given concept, in the exploration of the relations
between various internal aspects of a concept, or the relationships between
it and other related concepts. We understand this as a kind of conceptual
boundary work, which acts not only to reveal and explore any ambiguity,
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vagueness, and misunderstanding in our understanding of the concept and
its use, but also to reconstruct our conceptual schemata through a process of
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. This in fact is the most common
approach taken by the multitude of discussion plans in the Philosophy
for Children ‘manuals’, the great majority of which encourage exploration
of a concept with questions that push it beyond its ‘normal’ semantic
boundaries, and into the realm of the ‘fuzzy’.6
By way of example, questions like the following lead to the process of
de- and reconstruction of our understanding of the ontology of number:
What is number? Do numbers exist in nature? Is mathematics a language?
If so what role do numbers play in it? How are numbers and letters the
same or different? What can or cannot be expressed in numbers? In an
ideal situation, a discussion plan like this one is compiled from students’
questions, then added to by the facilitator to deepen or refine it.
Philosophical mathematical inquiry with children often oscillates, in our
experience, between two major overarching themes: a) the issue of the
presence and the role of mathematics in the world—whether the focus on
world be physical, psychological social, economic, epistemological,
ontological, or some other; and b) the nature of mathematics as a universe
or a language, and how we know and understand it. Students usually start
with questions that concern the first theme, which is a testimony to the
implicit, culturally inherited idea of the power and importance of
mathematics. The following is a set of fifth grade students’ questions
regarding the first theme, collected in the course of a CPI session
conducted by the authors in a fifth grade in a US school.7
A World Without Numbers











What would the world look like without numbers?
Could we survive without numbers?
Could we track anything without numbers?
Could you measure without numbers?
Would there be a calendar without numbers?
Would time be felt differently without numbers?
Would there be time without numbers?
Would we age if we did not know numbers?
Would money exist without numbers?
Would maths be possible without numbers? If so, what kind of
maths would it be?
 Would maths be possible without numerals?
 Would the calculation of numbers be possible without numerals?
 Is another maths without numbers possible?
And the following plans, also developed by fifth grade students and
added to by a facilitator, explore the second theme:
Knowing Numbers
 Where do numbers come from?
 Are numbers real?
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 Were numbers invented or discovered?
 If number were invented, why?
 Do plants and animals understand numbers? If so, what is the
difference between the human and the animal understanding of
number?
 Can the body count?
 Can we know numbers without symbols?
 Do things come with a specific number?
 Why is that the rules for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
division of numbers always work?
The goal of such questions about number is a marriage of mathematical
and philosophical inquiry, which encourages students to build an active
conceptual nexus, where a mathematical concept is not just an isolated
idea or confined to localised practice, but has rich connections with other
concepts, personal experience, informal knowledge, and other disciplines.
Philosophical inquiry integrated into maths classes offers an interrogative
space that is not artificially divided by subject walls, and promises the
development of a dispositional set oriented towards critical inquiry that
may be carried with them when students leave school.
PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE ACROSS CURRICULUM AND SCHOOL

Finally, we wish to sketch in broad strokes a curriculum that would
integrate communal philosophical inquiry into some or all of the traditional
school content areas. At the very least, three models for organising inquiry
into the common, central and contestable concepts within the disciplines are
possible—a single-discipline, an inter-disciplinary, and a whole-curriculum
approach. Each of these corresponds to a more general organisational model
for curriculum planning—that is, within a single classroom, between
classrooms, and across the whole school. Each can function more or less
emergently—meaning that the concepts are not pre-planned, but arise in the
course of the inquiry—and more or less democratically, meaning that the
concepts and the questions are generated by the students themselves, with
the teacher as co-participants.
The first model has already been discussed: a single-discipline approach
will identify a group of contestable concepts in, say, science, and through
a process of shared questioning and their own deliberative dialogue,
teachers and students will develop a series of exercises, discussion plans
and activities. Those concepts may be keyed to a textbook currently in use,
such that the concept ‘organism’, for example, is explored through
communal philosophical inquiry in the chapter in which it is produced and
defined. This is in fact an invaluable strategy for demythologising official
texts and encouraging students and teachers to enter into dialogue with
their epistemological assumptions, rather than accept them as given. As an
expository text, the textbook presents its assumptions as final and
authoritative—that is, it denies they are assumptions, and states them as
necessary axioms for learning. It assumes, in a linear and hierarchical
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fashion, that grasping the ‘basics’—in this case a previously determined
understanding of the concept—is necessary to constructing further
knowledge. To understand the concept as contestable introduces an
element of de- and reconstruction into the learning situation, and promises
the development of new meanings. When a window for problematisation
of concepts through philosophical dialogue is opened, the textbook loses
its status as bearer of hegemonic, officially sanctioned knowledge, and
takes on a narrative status—that is, it is understood as a voice, a speaker,
an interlocutor, as conditioned by ideology, historical placement, and
material conditions as any text—with which one can enter into dialogue.
Because it keeps the axioms of the discipline in open view, staying aware
of their historical and contextual character, this form of reading is
fundamental to the development of critical literacy.
The second model extends the identification of concepts across
disciplines, and thus connects the elements of the curriculum as a whole
through a network of contestable concepts. The concept ‘measurement’,
for example, can be problematised in multiple school subjects—whether
science, mathematics, history, psychology, anthropology, economics, art,
or music—and in fact allows the extension of student inquiry into the
ruling and guiding assumptions of the process of schooling—based as it so
often claims to be, on measurement—itself. This model would entail
teachers and students keying the concept to the texts in the various
disciplines, and thus creating an interweaving network of inquiry, which
would encourage teachers to understand the school curriculum as a whole,
and to collaborate in the organisation of their material, as well as in
identifying readings and assigning writings that connect disciplines, and
even sharing classroom time and space.
A third model would open the generation of common, central and
contestable concepts to the whole school. The use of a ‘central subject’,
either grade-wide or school wide, is one precursor of this, but the
generation of emergent philosophical themes that become the deliberative
objects of the entire community—concepts like justice change, technology, violence or nature—goes beyond this in scope and participation. A
concept like justice can be woven through different content areas in the
classroom, become the subject of whole or part-school meetings and
dialogue groups, and culminate in school-wide action groups—whether
concerned, for example, with justice within the school community, within
the larger community in which the school is set, or somewhere else on the
planet. In this stage of collaborative inquiry, philosophy returns to its own
disciplinary boundaries in the sense that it is no longer bound by one
content area or another, but it also responds to actual, immediate instances
where the concept is in play, and has the potential of resulting in real
democratic action.
In fact it is not just in collaborative deliberation that common, central,
and contestable philosophical concepts undergo reconstruction, but in
lived experience and the politics of relation, and the school is the embryonic society in which habits, not just of deliberation, but of neighbourhood, community and global activism are forged. In this school-wide
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model, philosophy, after dispersing itself among the disciplines, returns to
the agora—the public space—which is its rightful place in an authentic
democratic community, and deliberative communal dialogue functions as
the emergent compass, the tutor, and the normative horizon of that adultchild collective called ‘school’. As such, the utopian possibilities that CPI
offers for the reconstruction of childhood education are significant, but
that is matter for another article.
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NOTES
1. We would argue that even groups with no appointed leaders contain emergent ones, in keeping
with the inherent telos of the group toward distributed facilitation (for which see below).
2. We would argue further that in fact these moves are not merely linguistic products but originate
in the lived world of perception, and are linked with the operations of what Piaget (1952)
described as ‘sensori-motor intelligence’, but this is too bold and complicated a claim for this
article to attempt to justify. Nor is there space or occasion to explore the status of these moves in
the context of speech act theory, but this would also be of interest.
3. Although ‘narrative’ here refers to the novel, any stimulus can become one in the sense given
here—whether a work of art, natural artefact, or even an expository text, if that text is
approached in a critical manner.
4. And even scientific speech that has become normalised and left behind by science—the concept
‘alive’, for example, which has grown past the seven characteristics cited in every biology
textbook.
5. The historical and political implications of this epistemological shift towards the ‘critical’
subject was a major theme of 20th century psychology and social theory, and can be identified
in multiple versions—whether Fromm (1941), Adorno et al. (1950), Kelly (1963), Dewey
(1922), or many others. While these thinkers generated multiple descriptive categories, both
positive and negative, of psychological and sociological types, we can draw at least a crude
distinction between the monological and the multilogical thinker. The critical, multilogical
thinker both recognises the importance of a given common, central, and contestable concept (of
justice, for example) in living the ‘good life’, and thus the importance of reflecting on it, of
reconstructing it—and recognises the limitation of the concept as well. The monological
thinker tends to totalise and reify concepts, and attempts to locate them outside history, culture
and context. In so doing, he avoids or refuses the possibility of their problematisation—an
evolutionary habit which is increasingly dangerous in a multilogical word, in which multiple
perspectives confront each other in a global common space. The capacity for entertaining
multiple perspectives, and the skills and dispositions for collaborative, dialogical deliberation,
are adaptive habits that have become necessities in the emergent human evolutionary
environment.
6. As such, we avoid a head on confrontation with the question whether a large degree of ‘internal’
understanding of a discipline is necessary before one can problematise the contestable concepts
that inform it, given that our method consists of a deliberate transgression of domain boundaries,
and the practice of a kind of poetics of transfer. This question of domain specificity was a main
subject of debate in critical thinking circles in the late 1980s, and centred around issues of
epistemological subject specificity, interfield commonalities, transfer, and the feasibility of
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general thinking skills (Ennis, 1989; McPeck, 1981, 1990; Perkins and Salomon, 1989). Nor are
the issues raised by that debate resolved.
7. The discussion plans that follow were developed in a fifth-grade classroom in a public school in
Montclair, NJ, as part of a curriculum pilot project currently being conducted by the authors,
using as text a philosophical novel focusing on mathematics, designed for upper elementary
students.
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